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Fine-Tuning the Tax Whistleblower Statute: Why 
Qui-tam Is Not a Solution 
Sung Woo “Matt” Hu* 
Bradley C. Birkenfeld, a Massachusetts native who studied 
banking at the American Graduate School of Business in Swit-
zerland, began work in 2001 for UBS AG, a global bank head-
quartered in Switzerland.1 UBS sent Birkenfeld to various U.S. 
wealth havens to lure American investors into transferring 
their assets to UBS bank accounts.2 During the five years he 
spent recruiting American clients for UBS—which managed 
some $20 billion in assets for Americans—he persuaded bil-
lionaires like Igor Olenicoff3 to move several hundred million 
dollars to UBS.4 Birkenfeld would set up phony companies for 
such clients to conceal assets and give them credit cards to ac-
cess their concealed cash.5 Birkenfeld resigned from UBS in Oc-
tober 2005 after a fall-out and subsequently blew the whistle to 
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Helme and Jeff Simard who edited this Note as their own. Last but not least, 
many thanks to my beloved wife who has been a faithful witness and support-
er during those intense three years in law school. Copyright © 2014 by Sung 
Woo “Matt” Hu. 
 1. David Kocieniewsk, Whistle-Blower Awarded $104 Million by I.R.S., 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/business/ 
whistle-blower-awarded-104-million-by-irs.html. 
 2. Sheryl Phipps, The UBS Birkenfeld Case and the IRS’ Whistleblower 
Protection Program, 2013 EMERGING ISSUES 6910 (Jan. 31, 2013) (arguing 
how laxly the IRS is interpreting the “planned and initiated” exception to the 
whistleblower award mandate by granting a hefty award to an informant 
criminally convicted for his participation in the tax evasion). 
 3. Olenicoff is an American real estate developer on the Forbes 400 list of 
America’s most wealthy citizens. Igor Olenicoff, FORBES (Sept. 16, 2013, 7:51 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/profile/igor-olenicoff. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Stuart Pfeifer, Banking, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2009), http://articles 
.latimes.com/2009/oct/26/business/fi-swiss26. 
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the U.S. tax authorities about his former employer’s tax eva-
sion scheme.6 As a result of the investigation that followed, the 
IRS collected underpayments from approximately 15,000 U.S. 
taxpayers that had hidden money in UBS accounts.7 Although 
Birkenfeld spent two and a half years in jail for his participa-
tion in the scheme, he received $104 million from the $400 mil-
lion restitution paid by UBS.8 Mr. Birkenfeld’s whistleblower 
award was the largest ever paid to an individual by the IRS.9 
Although many—including Senator Charles E. Grassley 
who authored the tax whistleblower statute10—praised the 
IRS’s handling of Mr. Birkenfeld’s case as a successful applica-
tion of the reward program, most whistleblower claims, in fact, 
“fizzle.”11 Several commentators have criticized the whistle-
blower program as an incomplete enforcement mechanism.12 
Since 1867, the Secretary of Treasury has had legal authority 
to make discretionary payments for information that aids in de-
tecting tax underpayments and fraud.13 In 2006, Congress sub-
stantially reinforced the tax whistleblower program by enacting 
§ 7623(b) of the Internal Revenue Code (Tax Code).14 Under this 
provision, if the IRS decides to proceed with any administrative 
or judicial action based on information provided by a whistle-
blower, the whistleblower is entitled to an award of up to thirty 
percent of the collected proceeds unless the informant gets con-
 
 6. Phipps, supra note 2.  
 7. Id. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Kocieniewsk, supra note 1. 
 10. Id. (“Senator Charles E. Grassley, an Iowa Republican who helped 
write the law, said Mr. Birkenfeld’s award was an important step, but urged 
the I.R.S. to build on the momentum it had generated.”). 
 11. Robert W. Wood, Grassley Blows Whistle on IRS Whistleblower Pro-
gram, FORBES (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/ 
2013/09/30/grassley-blows-whistle-on-irs-whistleblower-program. 
 12. See, e.g., Joshua D. Rosenberg, Narrowing the Tax Gap: Behavioral 
Options, 117 TAX NOTES 517, 527–30 (2007) (arguing that the current tax 
whistleblower provision is as ineffective as pre-1986 qui tam provisions by not 
guaranteeing a minimum award for whistleblowers, not allowing individuals 
to participate in tax collection activities, and not providing any reimbursement 
of cost and attorney fees or job protection for whistleblowers); Dennis J. 
Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX LAW. 357, 359 (2008) 
(explaining the difference between the private enforcement mechanism of oth-
er federal statutes and that of the tax code, and arguing for the adoption of a 
qui tam action to the tax whistleblower program in order to overcome the pro-
gram’s shortcomings). 
 13. Whistleblower 14106-10W v. Comm’r, 137 T.C. 183, 186 (2011). 
 14. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b) (2012). The pre-2006 version of the tax whistle-
blower law, former § 7623, survives with minor changes as Section 7623(a). 
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victed for having “planned and initiated” such underpayment.15 
Most courts have interpreted the statutory language to mean 
that the IRS’s decision to pursue the informant’s claim is a pre-
requisite for demanding an award.16 However, some commenta-
tors criticize this interpretation for leaving too much discretion 
to the IRS, which may sleep on the whistleblower’s report or 
ignore it entirely.17  
Suggestions have been made to amend the tax whistle-
blower statute to allow informants to bring qui tam actions18 of 
the type allowed under the False Claims Act (FCA) when the 
IRS is irresponsive.19 A qui tam action allows a private individ-
ual to bring a civil action against someone who submitted 
fraudulent claims to the U.S. government.20 The logic of this 
theory is that allowing a private right of action closes the re-
source gap between the IRS and tax evaders, and becomes an 
effective remedy to the perceived agency inaction.21  
This Note argues that the adoption of qui tam action into 
the tax realm would be unconstitutional and detrimental to 
taxpayer privacy—one of the fundamental tenets portrayed in 
§ 6103 of the Tax Code—as well as to the IRS’s prosecutorial 
 
 15. Id. § 7623(b)(3); see also Cooper v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 70, 73 (2010) (de-
scribing the Secretary’s discretionary power regarding whistleblower awards). 
 16. See infra Parts I.B.2 and I.C.2 for a discussion of the interplay be-
tween the Tax Court and the IRS’s decision to pursue an informant’s claim.  
 17. Jeremiah Coder, The Whistleblower Whipsaw Process, 138 TAX NOTES 
1168 (2013) (pointing out the often criticized problem of giving too much dis-
cretion to the IRS when it comes to deciding whether to act on an informant’s 
claim, and the lack of redress for informants whose reports have been ig-
nored).  
 18. “Qui tam” is an abbreviated version of “qui tam pro domino rege quam 
pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur” that can be translated as “he who sues in this 
matter for the king as well as for himself.” Douglas K. Rosenblum & John A. 
Schwab, FCA 101: A Practitioner’s Guide to the False Claims Act, 26 CRIM. 
JUST. 26, 28 (2011).  
 19. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012) (“A person may bring a civil action for a vio-
lation of section 3729 for the person and for the United States Government. 
The action shall be brought in the name of the Government.”); see also Rosen-
berg, supra note 12; Ventry, supra note 12, at 371–72 (discussing qui tam ac-
tions). 
 20. See Rosenblum & Schwab, supra note 18, at 28. However, Tax Code 
violations are expressly excluded from the cause of action under the FCA. 31 
U.S.C. § 3729(d) (“This section does not apply to claims, records, or statements 
made under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.”). 
 21. See Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 527–31 (describing the value of qui 
tam actions); Ventry, supra note 12, at 370–77 (arguing for the adoption of qui 
tam actions). 
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discretion.22 Part I provides an overview of the tax whistleblow-
er program and its current problems, along with a primer on 
FCA qui tam procedures. Part II examines why the adoption of 
FCA-type qui tam provisions to the Tax Code is unlikely to be 
successful. Part III offers alternative solutions to the problem, 
delineating specific modifications that are needed to fix the 
language of the current statutory provisions. This Note con-
cludes that Congress should avoid bringing qui tam provisions 
into the tax whistleblower statute; it instead proposes a modifi-
cation of the Tax Court appeal right and the clarification of the 
permitted use of information protected by the professional duty 
of confidentiality.  
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE TAX WHISTLEBLOWER 
STATUTE AND ITS CURRENT ISSUES   
Before assessing the feasibility of adopting a qui tam pro-
vision in the tax code, this Note will examine the current state 
of the Code. Section A lays out the earlier version of the tax 
whistleblower statute. Section B explains the whistleblower-
friendly changes adopted by the 2006 amendment to the Code. 
Finally, Section C introduces the problems of the current whis-
tleblower program and Professors Joshua D. Rosenberg and 
Dennis J. Ventry, Jr.’s idea of adopting qui tam provisions in 
the tax code to solve those problems. 
A. PRE-2006 ERA OF TAX WHISTLEBLOWING 
The IRS’s whistleblower program dates back to 1867.23 
Back then, the Secretary of the Treasury had an unchecked 
discretion to pay “such sums as he deems necessary” for detect-
ing violations of internal revenue laws.24 Courts consistently 
held that § 7623 gave the IRS broad discretion to determine 
whether to pay an award in the first instance and how much to 
pay.25 The implementing regulations also provided that the size 
 
 22. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2012) (providing statutory protection for taxpay-
er information collected by the IRS). 
 23. Michelle M. Kwon, Whistling Dixie About the IRS Whistleblower Pro-
gram Thanks to the IRC Confidentiality Restrictions, 29 VA. TAX REV. 447, 451 
(2010). 
 24. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(a); Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(a), (c) (as amended 
1998). 
 25. Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(“[A]uthorities give the IRS broad discretion to decide whether to make an 
award or how much to grant.”); Carelli v. IRS, 668 F.2d 902, 904 (6th Cir. 
1982) (listing cases that have respected the Secretary of the Treasury’s award 
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of the reward would represent what “the district or service cen-
ter director deems to be adequate” in the particular case.26  
The earliest versions of the statute authorized the IRS to 
pay awards to informants largely for information leading to 
criminal tax violations.27 This was the status quo until 1996, 
when Congress added a clause to authorize payment of awards 
for information relating to civil violations, namely, “for detect-
ing underpayments of tax.”28  
Minor changes with respect to the award cap ensued in the 
following years. In 1997, the IRS raised the award ceiling from 
$100,000 to $2 million,29 and in 2004 it was increased to $10 
million.30 Below this cap, the IRS could award an amount with-
in its self-imposed range of one percent to fifteen percent of the 
amounts recovered from the taxpayer, according to its own ad-
ministrative discretion.31 An award could exceed fifteen percent 
of the recovered amounts in a rare case where the IRS and the 
whistleblower entered into a special agreement.32 
Before 2006, there was no express statutory provision for 
judicial review of tax whistleblower claims.33 Nevertheless, one 
way to challenge the agency decision was to raise a breach of an 
implied-in-fact contract claim, alleging that the IRS had not 
 
discretion); McGrath v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 978 (1975) (“We have no 
power to inquire into his use of discretion given to him exclusively by law.”); 
Saracena v. United States, 508 F.2d 1333, 1334–36 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (stating that 
the Service had “complete discretion in the first instance to determine whether 
an award should be made and . . . to fix what, in [its] judgment, amounts to 
adequate compensation”). 
 26. Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(c) (1999). 
 27. Charles P. Rettig, The IRS Whistleblower Program: Making Money the 
Old Fashioned Way!, J. TAX PRAC. & PROC., Apr.–May 2012, at 21. 
 28. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAXPAYER BILL OF RIGHTS 2, at 101 
(1996). 
 29. Rettig, supra note 27, at 22. 
 30. Id.  
 31. I.R.S., PUBLICATION 733: REWARDS FOR INFORMATION PROVIDED BY 
INDIVIDUALS TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Oct. 2004) [hereinafter 
PUBLICATION 733], available at http://www.unclefed.com/IRS-Forms/2005/ 
p733.pdf.  
 32. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., THE INFORMANTS’ RE-
WARDS PROGRAM NEEDS MORE CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT 2 
(2006) available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2006reports/ 
200630092fr.pdf (“The limits on the reward percentage and dollar amount can 
be waived by the use of a special agreement between the informant and the 
IRS, which must be approved by the IRS Commissioner or his or her dele-
gate.”). 
 33. Whistleblower 14106-10W v. Comm’r, 137 T.C. 183, 186 (2011) (citing 
Colman v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 633, 638 (2011)). 
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lived up to its promises portrayed in Tax Code § 7623 (whistle-
blower provisions),34 read in conjunction with the IRS Publica-
tion 733 (which details the payment process of whistleblower 
awards).35 However, federal courts often deferred to the judg-
ment of the agency, holding that Tax Code § 7623 and Publica-
tion 733 were merely the government’s invitation to the in-
formants to make an offer, and not a legally binding offer by 
themselves.36 Furthermore, courts emphasized that the IRS’s 
“District Director has complete discretion . . . to determine 
whether an award should be made.”37  
B. CHANGES OF THE 2006 AMENDMENT: MANDATORY AWARD 
AND APPEAL RIGHT 
Because of these award ceilings and the unchallengeable 
discretion the IRS possessed over the award, the IRS whistle-
blower program was largely dormant and underutilized until a 
major amendment was passed in 2006.38 The 2006 amendment 
to § 7623 “breathed life into the statute,” by providing in-
creased incentives and means to challenge the IRS’s award de-
termination in the Tax Court.39 Additionally, the enabling legis-
lation authorized the Service to create a centralized 
Whistleblower Office to process tips received from individuals 
who “spot tax problems.”40 The Office determines whether and 
how much to pay informants, a responsibility previously dele-
gated to Service District Directors dispersed throughout the 
 
 34. 26 U.S.C § 7623 (2012). 
 35. Krug v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 96, 97 (1998), aff’d, 168 F.3d 1307 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that the court must defer to the judgment of the Sec-
retary because no implied contract ever existed between the informant and the 
IRS, and thus there was no abuse of discretion); PUBLICATION 733, supra note 
31; see Kwon, supra note 23, at 453–54 (discussing § 7623 and Publication 
733); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2012) (also known as the Tucker Act, giving 
the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction to hear contract claims against the 
United States). 
 36. Krug v. United States, 168 F.3d 1307, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[I]n Pub-
lication 733 . . . § 7623 and the regulation, the Government invites offers for a 
reward; the informant makes an offer by his conduct; and the Government ac-
cepts the offer by agreeing to pay a specific sum.”); Krug, 41 Fed. Cl. at 98 
(“The United States cannot be contractually bound merely by invoking the cit-
ed statute and regulation.”). 
 37. Krug, 168 F.3d at 1310. 
 38. Ventry, supra note 12, at 361 (“In 1954, the statute was recodified as 
section 7623, where it remained largely unchanged, underutilized, and un-
known.”). 
 39. Ventry, supra note 12, at 361. 
 40. I.R.S., NEWS RELEASE IR-2007-25 (Feb. 2, 2007).  
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country.41 Part I.B.1 explains the increased bounties for in-
formants, and Part I.B.2 explains the whistleblowers’ right to 
appeal to the Tax Court under § 7623(b)(4). 
1. Mandatory, Increased Bounties for Whistleblowers 
The amendment requires the IRS to pay at least fifteen 
percent of the “collected proceeds”—including penalties, inter-
est, additions to tax, and any other amounts resulting from the 
action—to the whistleblower if the Secretary “proceeds with 
any administrative or judicial action” based on the informant’s 
tips.42 This was a major change from the prior law where the 
payments were discretionary, entirely dependent on what the 
District Director “deem[ed] to be adequate.”43 The amendment 
raised the maximum potential award to thirty percent of the 
recovered amounts and removed the $10 million cap.44 Thus, 
what used to be the maximum amount allowed in the pre-
amendment era—fifteen percent—became a bare minimum un-
der the new whistleblower regime.45 The award can be reduced 
to an amount less than ten percent if the claim is based primar-
ily on already publicly disclosed information, except if the whis-
tleblower was the “original source” of that information.46 The 
specific amount of an award within the statutorily mandated 
range depends on the extent to which the whistleblower’s in-
formation “substantially contributed” to the IRS’s investiga-
tion.47 Even a person who “planned and initiated” the tax eva-
sion scheme may be entitled to an award, albeit a reduced one, 
unless that person is convicted of a crime for his or her role in 
the scheme.48  
2. The New Tax Court Appeal Right 
Perhaps the most controversial feature of the amended 
whistleblower provision is the whistleblower’s right to appeal to 
the Tax Court.49 Unlike the prior law, which left the informants 
 
 41. Id.  
 42. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(1) (2012). 
 43. Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(c) (1999). 
 44. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(1). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. § 7623(b)(2)(A), (B). 
 47. Id. § 7623(b)(1). 
 48. Id. § 7623(b)(3). 
 49. See Coder, supra note 17 at 1169 (discussing tension regarding whis-
tleblowers’ ability to appeal IRS determinations of award eligibility). 
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powerless over the IRS’s determination as to the size of the 
award,50 the new statute provides that “[a]ny determination re-
garding an award . . . may, within 30 days of such determina-
tion, be appealed to the Tax Court.”51 The Tax Court has exclu-
sive jurisdiction over such appeals.52 For instance, a letter from 
the IRS Whistleblower Office denying a claim because no 
award could be made under § 7623(b) constitutes a determina-
tion conferring jurisdiction upon the Tax Court.53 However, 
§ 7623 is completely silent as to which standard of review the 
Tax Court should use.54 Moreover, § 7623(b)(4) is generally un-
derstood to mean that the whistleblower’s appeal right is trig-
gered if, and only if, the IRS actually proceeds with an adminis-
trative or judicial action.55 This interpretation emphasizes that 
the plain language of paragraph one,56 which is referred to by 
paragraph four,57 is operative only after an administrative or 
judicial action. Accordingly, a determination by the IRS declin-
ing to take any action based on a whistleblower’s information 
would be non-appealable.  
Overall, the amended tax whistleblower program has been 
a success. In fiscal year 2012 for instance, the IRS received 
 
 50. See supra Part I.A (describing pre-2006 tax whistleblower law). 
 51. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(4).  
 52. Id.; see Dacosta v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 549, 555 (2008) (stating 
that the Tax Court has exclusive jurisdiction over § 7623(b) claims). 
 53. Cooper v. Comm’r (Cooper I), 135 T.C. 70, 73 (2010). 
 54. Jeremiah Coder, Private Claimant Suits Might Inform Future Whistle-
Blower Cases, 122 TAX NOTES 332 (2009). In an October 2008 press release 
adopting the final whistleblower rules, the Tax Court stated that “[w]ithout 
specific statutory direction establishing whether whistleblower actions are to 
be decided on the administrative record, the Court contemplates that the ap-
propriate scope of review will be developed in case law.” Press Release, United 
States Tax Court (Oct. 3, 2008), available at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press/ 
100308.pdf. 
 55. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(1); Cohen v. Comm’r, 139 T.C. 299, 302 (2012), 
aff’d, 550 Fed. App’x 10 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Our jurisdiction under section 
7623(b) does not contemplate that we review the Commissioner’s determina-
tions of the alleged tax liability to which the claim pertains. . . . Nor does sec-
tion 7623 confer authority to direct the Commissioner to commence an admin-
istrative or judicial action.”); see Kwon, supra note 23, at 465. 
 56. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(1) (“If the Secretary proceeds with any adminis-
trative or judicial action described in subsection (a) based on information 
brought to the Secretary’s attention by an individual, such individual shall . . . 
receive as an award at least 15 percent but not more than 30 percent of the 
collected proceeds . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 57. Id. § 7623(b)(4) (“Any determination regarding an award under para-
graph (1), (2), or (3) may, within 30 days of such determination, be appealed to 
the Tax Court.”). 
HU_5fmt 12/1/2014 2:15 PM 
2014] FINE-TUNING 791 
 
8,634 whistleblower submissions and paid awards in 128 of 
those cases.58 The total amount of taxes collected based on the 
whistleblower information was $592,498,294 and from that 
amount, $125,355,799, i.e., 21.2% of the total collected pro-
ceeds, was awarded to the whistleblowers.59 However, many 
have raised concerns that despite the appeal right, whistle-
blowers are left without any recourse when the IRS simply 
chooses not to act on the whistleblowers’ information.60  
C. WHISTLEBLOWERS LEFT HELPLESS AGAINST IRS’S 
SLUGGISHNESS AND INACTION 
Despite the reinforced incentives for informants, there has 
been a “flood of negative comments over the past six years” con-
cerning how the IRS has treated whistleblowers.61 Under the 
current regime, the IRS may forever delay in making the award 
determination and the informants would have no recourse for 
seeking relief while waiting for the IRS’s decision.62 Likewise, 
when the IRS denies an award claim, “the informant is left 
empty-handed both monetarily and remedywise.”63 Part I.C.1 
explores the factors that affect the IRS’s claim processing time, 
Part 1.C.2 briefly examines some of the most recent Tax Court 
appeal cases, and Section 3 introduces a tentative suggested so-
lution to the problem, which will ultimately be refuted in Part 
II.  
1. Reasons for Delay and Agency Inaction 
Whistleblower claims can take years to go through the IRS 
review and award determination process.64 For example, in 
2011, about 66 percent of claims submitted in the first two 
 
 58. I.R.S., FISCAL YEAR 2012 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE USE OF 
SECTION 7623, 17 (2012) [hereinafter FY2012 I.R.S. REPORT]. The number of 
claims surged 1000% from 2007. Stephen Ohlemacher, Tips on Tax Cheats 
Skyrocket with Bigger Rewards, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www 
.whistleblowers.org/storage/whistleblowers/documents/aptipsontaxcheats.pdf. 
 59. FY2012 I.R.S. REPORT, supra note 58 at 17.  
 60. See, e.g., Coder, supra note 17, at 1169 (describing the IRS’s ability to 
thwart whistleblower relief). 
 61. Id. at 1168.  
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 1169.  
 64. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX WHISTLEBLOWERS: 
INCOMPLETE DATA HINDERS IRS'S ABILITY TO MANAGE CLAIM PROCESSING 
TIME AND ENHANCE EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION 8 (2011) [hereinafter GAO, 
TAX WHISTLEBLOWERS] (reporting to Congress the reasons for the tax whistle-
blower program’s lack of transparency and long claim processing time). 
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years of the program—fiscal years 2007 and 2008—were still in 
process.65 Additionally, 447 claims submitted in fiscal year 2010 
had been in the Whistleblower Office’s initial claim review step 
for at least 200 days.66 One of the reasons for the long pro-
cessing time is that the IRS Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) 
and the staff at its Whistleblower Office are vastly outnum-
bered by the claims submitted each year.67 After the initial 
screening by the Whistleblower Office, SMEs with in-depth 
knowledge in various industries review the claims and decide 
whether to pursue the issue raised by the whistleblower.68 
However, the IRS’s three civil divisions (Large Business and 
International, Small Business/Self-Employed, and Tax Exempt 
and Government Entities) only have between seven and ten 
SMEs each, and the SMEs often have other work priorities that 
may delay their review of whistleblower claims.69  
As identified by Stephen A. Whitlock, head of the Whistle-
blower Office, another important reason for the delay is that 
the IRS spends a tremendous amount of time filtering out in-
formation it is not supposed to use.70 Many of the tips submit-
ted by informants contain privileged information that may 
taint the integrity of the whistleblower program and be of lim-
ited use in a courtroom.71 Parsing through the submitted mate-
rials that may include attorney-client privileged and other le-
gally protected information and insulating them from the IRS 
audit team can be a time-consuming endeavor.72 Finally, the 
taxpayer’s appeal process and two-year refund period may sub-
stantially delay the whistleblower’s receipt of the award.73  
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. at 9. 
 68. Taxpayers Against Fraud Educ. Fund, An Interview with IRS Whistle-
blower Office Director Stephen A. Whitlock, 52 FALSE CLAIMS ACT & QUI TAM 
Q. REV. 81, 87 (2009) [hereinafter Whitlock Interview].  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 96. 
 71. Id. at 87. 
 72. Id. at 87–88. In addition, the IRS spends time investigating the rela-
tionship between the whistleblower and the taxpayer because certain individ-
uals are not eligible at all for awards, including federal employees who learn of 
tax noncompliance in the course of their work activities or individuals who are 
current representatives, such as attorneys or accountants, of the targeted tax-
payer. GAO, TAX WHISTLEBLOWERS, supra note 64, at 9.  
 73. GAO, TAX WHISTLEBLOWERS, supra note 64, at 10 (explaining that 
taxpayers can appeal the IRS’s assessment of tax, so that the case can be re-
viewed by the U.S. Tax Court, U.S. Court of Federal Claims, or a U.S. district 
court). 
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2. Whistleblower’s Right To Appeal and the Tax Court’s 
Limited Power 
What happens if the IRS declines to take any action based 
on the informant’s tips and subsequently declines to give out 
any award to the informant? “Nothing” would be the correct 
answer under the current state of the law. In Cooper v. Com-
missioner, the Tax Court decided that it had jurisdiction in 
such cases where the IRS declined to pursue a claim and issued 
a letter notifying the informant that an award could not be 
made.74 However, the Tax Court held in subsequent cases that 
it did not have any authority to compel the IRS to pursue an in-
formant’s claim.75  
For instance, in Cohen v. Commissioner, a whistleblower 
challenged the IRS’s decision not to pursue information he had 
provided on the ground that the IRS abused its discretion.76 The 
whistleblower alleged that the IRS denied his claim for an 
award without instituting an administrative or judicial action 
or collecting any proceeds.77 The Tax Court held that although 
it had jurisdiction with respect to the IRS’s award determina-
tion, its jurisdiction under § 7623(b) did “not contemplate” that 
the court should review the IRS’s determinations of the alleged 
tax liability.78 Moreover, the court determined that § 7623 does 
not “confer authority to direct the Commissioner to commence 
an administrative or judicial action.”79 Hence, the court dis-
missed the whistleblower’s petition for failure to state a claim.80  
In other words, the new Tax Court appeal right under 
 
 74. Cooper v. Comm’r (Cooper I), 135 T.C. 70, 76 (2010) (holding that 
IRS’s denial to pursue claims constituted an IRS determination that tees up a 
whistleblower’s appeal rights).  
 75. See O’Donnell v. Comm’r, 489 Fed. App’x 469 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per 
curiam) (holding that the IRS was correct in its denial of a whistleblower 
award); Cohen v. Comm’r, 139 T.C. 299, 304 (2012) (holding similarly to 
Cooper II but on the ground of failure to state a claim); Whistleblower 14106-
10W v. Comm’r 137 T.C. 183 (2011) (ruling that, under § 7623(b)(1), a whistle-
blower award is dependent both upon the initiation of an administrative or 
judicial action and the collection of tax proceeds and that if the IRS does not 
proceed, there can be no whistleblower award); Cooper v. Comm’r (Cooper II), 
136 T.C. 597, 601 (2011) (holding that the Tax Court lacked authority to direct 
the IRS to proceed with an administrative or judicial action in response to ap-
plicant’s information regarding alleged underpayment of tax). 
 76. Cohen, 139 T.C. at 299. 
 77. Id. at 299–300. 
 78. Id. at 302. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 304. 
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§ 7623(b)(4) turned out to be a tiger with no teeth when the 
case law became settled that the Tax Court could do nothing 
about the IRS’s inaction. Practically the only time the Tax 
Court can intervene and adjudicate on the IRS’s determination 
is when the actual amount of the bounty is in dispute.81  
3. Is Bringing Qui Tam into the Tax Code the Solution?  
Two tax professors based in California have proposed a so-
lution to the problem that would change the complete land-
scape of the tax enforcement system: adoption of qui tam ac-
tion.82 Subsection a provides a brief overview of the FCA’s qui 
tam process and its relation to the tax code. Subsection b intro-
duces Professor Rosenberg’s idea—later elaborated on by Pro-
fessor Ventry—of adopting a private enforcement mechanism 
in the Tax Code.  
a. Overview of the FCA’s Qui Tam Provisions 
Many federal statutes, including antitrust laws and the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 
authorize private rights of action for statutory violations.83 Pri-
vate suits by the victims of statutory violations often serve an 
important public function, “in that the threat of private en-
forcement can deter potential violators.”84 One type of private 
enforcement action oriented toward public law enforcement is 
the so-called “qui tam” suit, in which “a private party, known 
as a ‘relator,’ brings suit against a private defendant on behalf 
of the government to redress some public wrong.”85 The qui tam 
 
 81. Kevan P. McLaughlin, IRS Should Modify Whistleblower Program, 
California State Bar Member Says, 2013 TAX NOTES TODAY 132-42, Part II.B 
(2013) (“Under the Cooper II logic then, the court appears left with only one 
role in overseeing whistleblower awards—adjudicating whether the IRS was 
correct in deciding to pay a 15% award, as opposed to an 18%, 22%, 26%, or 
some other amount.”); Robert W. Wood, What if IRS Doesn’t Pursue Your 
Whistleblower Claim?, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
robertwood/2012/10/15/what-if-irs-doesnt-pursue-your-whistleblower-claim. 
 82. See Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 517; Ventry, supra note 12, at 406. 
 83. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (2012) (allowing a private right of action 
for antitrust violations); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2012) (allowing private civil 
remedies under RICO to compensate for limited governmental resources).  
 84. Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: 
The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 
98 (2005) (summarizing the pros and cons of different types of private en-
forcement arrangements and arguing that the executive branch rather than 
Congress should have more control over the existence and scope of private en-
forcement actions). 
 85. Id. 
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suit seeks to strengthen the enforcement of federal law by 
“deputizing” private individuals as “private attorney gener-
als.”86 
Qui tam is an important private enforcement mechanism 
used by the FCA. Under the FCA, it is unlawful to knowingly 
present, or cause to be presented, “a false or fraudulent claim 
for payment or approval” to the government.87 It is similarly 
unlawful to knowingly make “a false record or statement mate-
rial to a false or fraudulent claim.”88  
Prior to filing a complaint under the FCA, a relator must 
serve a pre-filing disclosure of all allegations and material evi-
dence on the government.89 Thereafter, the complaint is filed 
under seal in the U.S. district court of the relator’s choice.90 A 
copy of the complaint must be served on the government, and 
the complaint remains under seal for a minimum of sixty days 
to provide the government time to investigate the matter with-
out the defendant knowing of the allegations.91 The sixty-day 
seal is routinely extended by order of the court upon motion of 
the government for good cause shown.92  
Upon conclusion of its investigation, the government noti-
fies the whistleblower whether or not it will intervene in the 
case.93 If the government proceeds with the action, it takes over 
the primary responsibility for prosecuting the action and is not 
bound by an act of the relator.94 If the government declines to 
intervene, whistleblowers have the right to prosecute the case 
themselves.95 The FCA permits whistleblowers to share in the 
 
 86. Id. at 99–100. 
 87. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012). The majority of recoveries by the fed-
eral government under the FCA have been in the health care and defense sec-
tors—the two areas that account for a massive portion of the government’s 
budget. Rosenblum & Schwab, supra note 18, at 27. 
 88. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B). 
 89. Id. § 3730(b)(2) (“A copy of the complaint and written disclosure of 
substantially all material evidence and information the person possesses shall 
be served on the Government pursuant to Rule 4(d)(4) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.”). 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. (“The complaint shall be filed in camera, shall remain under seal 
for at least 60 days, and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so 
orders. The Government may elect to intervene and proceed with the action 
within 60 days after it receives both the complaint and the material evidence 
and information.”). 
 92. Id. § 3730(b)(3). 
 93. Rosenblum & Schwab, supra note 18, at 28.  
 94. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1). 
 95. Rosenblum & Schwab, supra note 18, at 28. 
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resulting recoveries if they win.96 Qualifying whistleblowers can 
receive fifteen to thirty percent of recoveries, depending on 
whether the United States took over prosecution of a case.97 
There is no cap on the amount that can be recovered, and whis-
tleblowers have the right to enforce their claims to rewards in 
federal district court.98 
In addition to those who submit fraudulent claims, the 
FCA punishes someone who knowingly makes a false state-
ment as to an obligation to pay money to the government or 
knowingly conceals and avoids an obligation to pay money to 
the government.99 However, it is important to note that the 
FCA contains a major exclusion that makes the qui tam provi-
sions inapplicable to “claims, records, or statements made un-
der the Internal Revenue Code.”100  
b. Importing Qui Tam: Privatizing Tax Enforcement 
Even though Congress explicitly prohibited the use of the 
FCA in the tax context, some academics have entertained the 
idea of adopting a qui tam option to the tax whistleblower stat-
ute. Professor Joshua Rosenberg was the first to make such an 
argument in 1996.101 While noting the success of the qui tam 
provisions under the FCA, Rosenberg wrote: 
[S]ome large tax qui tam cases would likely attract significant media 
attention. Attorneys, accountants, and other tax planners and tax 
compliance personnel would realize that they could no longer rely on 
the silence and acquiescence of others, and that cheating on taxes had 
become a dangerous sport both for their employer and, because their 
participation would inevitably be exposed, for themselves.102 
 
 96. Paul D. Scott, Tax Whistle-Blowers To Receive Increased Rewards, 114 
TAX NOTES 441, 441 (2007). 
 97. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)–(2). 
 98. Scott, supra note 96, at 442. 
 99. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G). 
 100. Id. § 3729(d); United States ex rel. Lissack v. Sakura Global Capital 
Mkts., Inc., 377 F.3d 145, 157 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the FCA’s explicit 
tax bar precluded relator’s claim of “yield burning,” a federal income tax eva-
sion scheme); Almeida v. United Steelworkers Int’l Union, 50 F. Supp. 2d 115, 
127 (D.R.I. 1999) (“The Court is unable to imagine how Congress could have 
expressed its intent more clearly than it did in § 3729(e).”). 
 101. Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us 
Crazy, and How We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 210 (1996). 
 102. Id. at 211.  
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His main argument was that a whistleblower system that 
incorporates a qui tam provision can establish a “norm of tax 
honesty,” rather than tax evasion.”103  
Additionally, Professor Rosenberg argued that adopting a 
qui tam provision would close the resource gap between the IRS 
and large institutional private taxpayers.104 His assumption 
was that “[m]ost if not all of the transactions reported by whis-
tleblowers . . . are likely to be large, and potentially complex, 
transactions, and most of the taxpayers reported are likely to 
be able to afford large teams of high-priced [defense] law-
yers.”105 Even if it is assumed that the IRS has equally brilliant 
and dedicated attorneys, he states, taxpayers involved in dis-
putes with the IRS may be able to outman the IRS simply be-
cause they can throw more money at the case.106 He argues that 
this imbalance “would be quickly undone if attorneys . . . seek-
ing to collect taxes were compensated at rates and in amounts 
similar to those seeking to avoid them.107 In his view, qui tam 
provisions that provide for attorney’s fees could “go far towards 
leveling the playing field.”108 
Professor Ventry further elaborated on Professor Rosen-
berg’s argument in a 2008 article, advocating qui tam as an ef-
fective way to increase transparency by incentivizing insiders 
to come forward with the “concealed” information.109 He argues, 
as Rosenberg did, that the qui tam action could significantly re-
inforce compliant behavior by publicizing the conviction of tax 
code violations, and that it could narrow the resource gap be-
tween the taxpayers and the IRS.110 
Although Professor Ventry discusses the concerns about 
taxpayer privacy and abusive law suits that are inextricably re-
lated to the qui tam procedure, he dismisses the concerns as 
“eminently surmountable.”111 He argues that the public’s need 
for increased tax compliance easily trumps the need for the pro-
tection of taxpayer information.112 Further, he argues that frivo-
 
 103. Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 525. 
 104. Id. at 526. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 526–27. 
 107. Id. at 527. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Ventry, supra note 12, at 371. 
 110. Id. at 376–78. 
 111. Id. at 372–76. 
 112. See id. at 373–74. 
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lous, meritless claims can be controlled by imposing restrictions 
on such claims, setting a high-dollar threshold for a qui tam ac-
tion, or by giving an exclusive power to the IRS to dismiss abu-
sive claims.113 Part II of this Note refutes Professor Ventry’s as-
sertions on four distinct grounds.  
II.  WHY QUI TAM IS NOT A SOLUTION   
This Note refutes some of the primary assumptions under-
lying the argument that qui tam actions should be imported in-
to the tax whistleblower program. Section A discusses how a 
tax qui tam relator would lack standing under Article III of the 
U.S. Constitution. Section B explains the importance of safe-
guarding taxpayer information and how qui tam actions may 
destroy the confidentiality of taxpayer information. Section C 
explains the importance of preserving the IRS’s administrative 
discretion. Finally, Section D discusses the challenges of choos-
ing an appropriate forum for a tax qui tam action.  
A. TAX RELATOR’S LACK OF ARTICLE III STANDING 
Even if Congress adds qui tam provisions to the Tax Code, 
the U.S. Supreme Court would likely nullify the amendment as 
unconstitutional. A plaintiff “must meet three requirements in 
order to establish Article III standing.”114 First, a plaintiff must 
show that “it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete 
and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural 
or hypothetical.”115 Second, the plaintiff must establish causa-
tion by showing that the injury was “fairly traceable to the 
challenged action of the defendant.”116 Finally, the plaintiff 
must demonstrate redressability—a substantial likelihood 
“that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”117 
These three requirements together constitute the “irreducible 
constitutional minimum” of standing under Article III’s case-or-
controversy requirement.118  
 
 113. Id. at 375. 
 114. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 
765, 771 (2000) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 
528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)).  
 115. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 180. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 181. 
 118. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding that 
a citizen environmental group challenging a rule promulgated by the Secre-
tary of the Interior interpreting § 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 
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Irrespective of these minimum requirements, in Vermont 
Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 
the Supreme Court held that the FCA’s grant of qui tam stand-
ing to private individuals did not violate Article III’s standing 
requirement.119 The Court relied mainly on two rationales: the 
Assignment of Claim doctrine and the history and tradition of 
qui tam litigation.120 Justice Scalia first found the “adequate 
basis for the relator’s suit . . . in the doctrine that the assignee 
of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by 
the assignor.”121 He ruled that the FCA effected “a partial as-
signment of the Government’s damages claim” to a private in-
dividual.122 Second, the Court went on to analyze “the long tra-
dition of qui tam actions in England and the American 
Colonies.”123 According to Justice Scalia, “[t]hat history is par-
ticularly relevant to the constitutional standing inquiry 
since . . . Article III’s restriction of the judicial power to ‘Cases’ 
and ‘Controversies’ is properly understood to mean ‘cases and 
controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved 
by, the judicial process.’”124 The Court observed that qui tam ac-
tions originated around the thirteenth century and “have been 
as prevalent in America as in England, at least in the period 
immediately before and after the framing of the Constitu-
tion.”125 Thus, it was “nigh conclusive” that qui tam actions 
were “cases and controversies . . . traditionally amenable to . . . 
the judicial process.”126 
However, the Vermont Agency rationales are not readily 
applicable to the federal tax context. First, the IRS is the only 
government agency in the United States that does not need to 
 
lacked standing because the plaintiff did not suffer any concrete injury and 
only claimed a generalized grievance). 
 119. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 
765, 777–78 (2000). 
 120. Id. at 773–76. 
 121. Id. at 773. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 774.  
 124. Id. (“[J]udicial power could come into play only in matters that were 
the traditional concern of the courts at Westminster and only if they arose in 
ways that to the expert feel of lawyers constituted ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’” 
(quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (opinion of Frankfurter, 
J.). 
 125. Id. at 774, 776.  
 126. Id. at 777 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 
102 (1998)). 
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bring a lawsuit to collect money due from a citizen.127 The IRS 
can take direct actions to collect the liability by: 1) imposing a 
federal tax lien; 2) serving a notice of levy; or 3) offsetting a re-
fund to which the taxpayer is entitled.128 Further, the IRS can 
impose monetary penalties when taxpayers underpay their fed-
eral income taxes.129 In this sense, Vermont Agency’s assignor-
assignee doctrine would have questionable applicability in the 
tax context where the IRS typically does not raise a “legal 
claim” against the taxpayer in a judicial forum, but enforces the 
tax code through its own collection mechanism. If Congress can 
readily “assign” this unique type of agency prerogative to a pri-
vate individual in the form of a private right of action, then the 
separation of powers principle may suffer. As Justice Scalia 
himself pointed out in Lujan, “[t]o permit Congress to convert 
the undifferentiated public interest in [tax compliance] into an 
‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress 
to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Execu-
tive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed.’”130 Adoption of qui tam action in 
the Tax Code would thus “enable the courts, with the permis-
sion of Congress, ‘to assume a position of authority over the 
governmental acts of another and co-equal department,’” and to 
become “virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and 
soundness of Executive action.”131  
Furthermore, unlike the conventional type of qui tam un-
der the FCA, there has been no such history or tradition of pri-
vate enforcement when it comes to collecting federal taxes. Sec-
tion 3729(d) of the FCA explicitly bars the application of the qui 
tam provisions to “claims, records, or statements made under 
 
 127. See generally Topic 201–The Collection Process, IRS.GOV, http://www 
.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc201.html (last updated Aug. 7, 2014) (explaining how the 
IRS collects money from citizens).  
 128. Id.; I.R.S., PUBLICATION 594, at 4–7, available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-pdf/p594.pdf. 
 129. Topic 306–Penalty for Underpayment of Estimated Tax, IRS.GOV, 
http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc306.html (last updated June 18, 2014); see also, 
Jim Blankenship, Understanding the Underpayment Penalty and How To 
Avoid It, FORBES (June 25, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/advisor/ 
2012/06/25/understanding-the-underpayment-penalty-and-how-to-avoid-it (ex-
plaining that the IRS will assess an underpayment penalty when individuals 
fail to pay enough taxes during the year). 
 130. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (quoting U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 3). 
 131. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 
489 (1923); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984)). 
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the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.”132 This “Tax Bar” was add-
ed to the FCA in 1986, along with the “reverse false claims” 
provision— section 3729(a)(1)(G)—which created FCA liability 
for false statements designed to conceal, reduce, or avoid “an 
obligation to pay . . . money or property to the Government.”133 
The Senate Report states that “the False Claims Act does not 
apply to income taxes cases, and the Committee does not intend 
that it should be so used.”134 Additionally, “courts that have 
considered the Tax Bar have concluded that it was intended to 
codify case law existing before the 1986 amendment, which re-
served discretion to prosecute tax violations to the IRS and 
barred FCA actions based on tax violations.”135  
Although some states have enacted their own versions of 
false claims acts without the explicit Tax Bar, New York is the 
only state that has explicitly allowed a private right of action 
based on state tax law violations.136 Nevertheless, New York’s 
tax qui tam provision has only been in place since August 
2010.137 In light of these underlying facts, it is highly unlikely 
that the Supreme Court would find a long-standing history of 
private enforcement in the federal income tax context.  
B. SECTION 6103 AND THE SANCTITY OF TAXPAYER 
INFORMATION 
Adopting qui tam provisions in the Tax Code runs the risk 
of unduly exposing taxpayer information protected under 
§ 6103 to the general public.138 Before the Tax Reform Act of 
1976, § 6103 gave the IRS broad discretion to disclose tax in-
 
 132. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(d) (2012). 
 133. See False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 2, 
100 Stat. 3153, 3153–54 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G), 
(d)). 
 134. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 18 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 
5283. 
 135. United States ex rel. Lissack v. Sakura Global Capital Mkts., Inc., 377 
F.3d 145, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2004); see also United States ex rel. U.S.-Namibia 
Trade & Cultural Council v. Africa Fund, 588 F. Supp. 1350, 1351 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984) (“In essence, plaintiff is attempting to enforce the tax laws through an 
improper vehicle—the False Claims Act.”). 
 136. See N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 190(2)(a) (McKinney 2013); Franziska 
Hertel, Note, Qui Tam for Tax?: Lessons from the States, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
1897, 1915–16 (2013). 
 137. GAO, TAX WHISTLEBLOWERS, supra note 64, at 7 (“New York’s [whis-
tleblower] program has a tax qui tam provision that was enacted in August 
2010.”). 
 138. Section 6103 states that “[r]eturns and return information shall be 
confidential.” 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a) (2012). 
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formation by providing that “returns . . . shall constitute public 
records.”139 The Service treated tax returns and other return in-
formation as a “generalized government asset” that was widely 
disseminated to federal, state, and local government officials.140 
However, Congress amended § 6103 in 1976 in the aftermath of 
the Watergate scandal in which the Nixon White House ob-
tained some of its political opponents’ tax returns from the IRS 
for improper political purposes.141 The 1976 amendments thus 
marked a philosophical shift from treating tax information as a 
“governmental asset” that the executive branch was able to dis-
tribute at will, to a confidential, protected asset that only Con-
gress could disseminate.142  
Leaks of taxpayer information and misuse of that infor-
mation in political fights is not an antiquated fear. The Ameri-
can Center for Law & Justice recently filed a complaint against 
 
 139. See CHARLES DAVENPORT ET AL., REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURES OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, S. DOC. NO. 94-266, at 835–53 (1975) (summa-
rizing the history of the disclosure of federal tax information). 
 140. PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM’N, FEDERAL TAX RETURN CONFIDENTIAL-
ITY 13–14 (1976) [hereinafter PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT]; see also STAFF 
OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX 
REFORM ACT OF 1976, 313–15, 324 (1976), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 2, at 325–
27, 335 (stating that “the Justice Department and other Federal agencies, as a 
practical matter, [were] able to obtain that information for nontax purposes 
almost at their sole discretion”); OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEP’T OF TREASURY, 
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON SCOPE AND USE OF TAXPAYER CONFIDENTIALITY 
AND DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS, VOLUME 1: STUDY OF GENERAL PROVISIONS 21 
(2000) [hereinafter 2000 TREASURY REPORT] (“Congress recognized that the 
IRS had more information about citizens than any other Federal agency, and 
that other agencies routinely sought access to that information.”). 
 141. One of the articles of impeachment alleged that President Nixon had 
“endeavored to obtain from the Internal Revenue Service, in violation of the 
constitutional rights of citizens, confidential information contained in income 
tax returns for purposes not authorized by law.” COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, at 3 (1974); see also James N. Benedict & Leslie A. 
Lupert, Federal Income Tax Returns–The Tension Between Government Access 
and Confidentiality, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 940, 941–42 (1979) (stating that 
“Watergate-related events in the 1970’s where evidence was uncovered that 
President Nixon may have had income tax audits and investigations initiated 
and conducted in a discriminatory manner for purposes unrelated to the col-
lection of taxes” partly motivated the amendment of § 6103). 
 142. PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 140, at 28 (concluding that 
Congress, rather than the executive branch, should have the authority to per-
mit the IRS to make disclosures of tax information); see also DAVENPORT ET 
AL., supra note 139, at 1023 (“[A]dministrative practice should largely be re-
versed, and the veil of confidentiality drawn around returns once again. If it is 
to be lifted, Congress should do so.”). 
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the IRS, alleging that IRS employees divulged the Tea-Party 
plaintiffs’ confidential information in violation of § 6103.143 In 
May 2013, the IRS indeed revealed that it inappropriately se-
lected Tea Party political groups for stricter scrutiny in the 
2012 presidential campaign.144 Although there is no evidence 
that directly links the IRS misconduct to the White House,145 
this incident is another example that shows the importance of 
safeguarding the broad array of taxpayer information that lies 
in the IRS’s hands.  
1. Sanctity of Taxpayer Privacy Under § 6103 
Section 6103 renders tax returns and return information 
strictly confidential. The section prohibits the IRS from disclos-
ing taxpayers’ tax information absent an explicit statutory ex-
ception.146 Items protected from disclosure include tax returns; 
the taxpayer’s identity; the nature, source, and amount of in-
come, gain, deductions, credits, and other tax return items; as 
well as whether the taxpayer “was, is being, or will be exam-
ined or subject to other investigation or processing.”147 Virtually 
any information received, prepared, or collected by the IRS re-
garding a person’s tax liability is protected from disclosure.148 
For instance, in Krug v. United States, the Court of Federal 
Claims asked the IRS to provide reasons for its denial of a 
whistleblower award, and the IRS rejected the request assert-
ing that “it was unable to give specific reasons for denial of 
Krug’s reward claims because of the restrictions imposed on 
 
 143. Complaint at 76–78, Linchpins of Liberty v. United States, No. 1:13-
cv-000777-RBW (D.D.C. May, 29, 2013), available at http://media.aclj.org/pdf/ 
second-amended-complaint-filed-redacted.pdf.  
 144. Zachary A. Goldfarb & Karen Tumulty, IRS Admits Targeting Con-
servatives for Tax Scrutiny in 2012 Election, WASH. POST (May 10, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/irs-admits-targeting 
-conservatives-for-tax-scrutiny-in-2012-election/2013/05/10/3b6a0ada-b987-
11e2-92f3-f291801936b8_story.html (stating that the IRS acknowledged that 
groups with the words “tea party” or “patriot” in their applications for tax-
exempt status faced additional screening). 
 145. IRS Scandal Investigation Continues, THE PATRIOT POST (Nov. 11, 
2013), http://patriotpost.us/articles/21558 (“Rep. Sandy Levin (D-MI) says, 
‘There is zero evidence that the White House was involved in this.’”).  
 146. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a) (2012). 
 147. Id. § 6103(b)(1) (defining “return”); id. § 6103(b)(2) (defining “return 
information”). 
 148. See, e.g., Snider v. United States, 468 F.3d 500, 506 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(noting that the term “return information” is defined broadly); Payne v. United 
States, 289 F.3d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting the same point). 
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disclosing confidential tax information.”149 The court eventually 
conducted in camera review of the taxpayer documents “to de-
termine whether the Secretary had a rational basis for denying 
plaintiff’s reward claims.”150 Although taxpayer privacy was not 
the main issue in the case, the court’s cautious handling of tax-
payer information shows its willingness to preserve confidenti-
ality even when a whistleblower challenges the “integrity of the 
IRS procedure.”151  
Section 6103 contains thirteen exceptions to the general 
rule.152 Major exceptions include disclosures to Congress, De-
partment of Justice and Treasury employees, and state tax offi-
cials for tax administration purposes.153 Additional exceptions 
include disclosures for nontax criminal investigations and ter-
rorist activities investigations.154 These exceptions are often 
very narrowly prescribed.155 To date, no exception permits the 
IRS to disclose a taxpayer’s information to a whistleblower.156 
2. How Qui Tam Litigation May Invade Upon Taxpayer 
Privacy 
Adoption of qui tam litigation will undermine two im-
portant policy objectives nested within § 6103: preservation of 
the taxpayer’s reasonable expectation of privacy and the volun-
tary compliance scheme of the American federal income tax 
system. 
a. Disrupting the Taxpayer’s Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy 
Safeguarding federal tax information is an important as-
pect of protecting privacy.157 The IRS proclaims on its website: 
 
 149. Krug v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 96, 98 (1998), aff’d, 168 F.3d 1307 
(Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 150. Id. (whistleblower alleged that the IRS decision was an abuse of ad-
ministrative discretion). 
 151. Id. at 98–99. 
 152. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(c)–(o). 
 153. Id. § 6103(d) (state tax officials); id. § 6103(f) (congressional commit-
tees); id. § 6103(h)(1) (Department of Treasury employees); id. § 6103(h)(2) 
(Department of Justice employees). 
 154. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(l), (3). 
 155. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-231SP, TAXPAYER PRI-
VACY: A GUIDE FOR SCREENING AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO DISCLOSE CON-
FIDENTIAL TAX INFORMATION TO SPECIFIC PARTIES FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES 4 
(2011) [hereinafter GAO, TAXPAYER PRIVACY]. 
 156. Kwon, supra note 23, at 472. 
 157. GAO, TAXPAYER PRIVACY, supra note 155, at 17. 
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“Protecting sensitive data entrusted to us by taxpayers is a top 
priority of ours. We believe it is vital to maintaining public 
trust in the tax administration system.”158 This policy is in line 
with’ Fair Information Practice Principles, which state “it is 
important to ensure that information collected for one govern-
ment function is not used indiscriminately for other, unrelated 
functions.”159  
When it comes to collecting individually identifiable data, 
it is often said that the IRS compiles more information about 
more people than any other agency.160 Much of the information 
the IRS collects is considered highly sensitive. The individual 
income tax return, for example, requires the taxpayer to reveal 
his place of residence, marital status, dependents, the source of 
his income, and is an annual measure of the taxpayer’s finan-
cial well-being.161 To obtain itemized deductions, the taxpayer 
may need to reveal even more intimate details, including the 
taxpayer’s religious affiliation and whether the taxpayer is un-
der the care of a doctor or psychiatrist.162 
Furthermore, Congress granted a powerful investigatory 
authority to the IRS by promulgating § 7602.163 This provision 
gives the IRS the power to “examine any books, papers, records, 
or other data which may be relevant” to determining the cor-
 
 158. What Are We Doing To Protect Taxpayer Privacy?, IRS.GOV, 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/What-are-we-doing-to-protect-taxpayer-privacy%3F 
(last updated Apr. 8, 2014). 
 159. GAO, TAXPAYER PRIVACY, supra note 155, at 18; see also U.S. FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 8–9 (1998), availa-
ble at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/exploring 
-privacy-roundtable-series/priv-23a.pdf (explaining the importance of the pri-
vacy holder’s “choice” related to secondary uses of his or her information); THE 
WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR TRUSTED IDENTITIES IN CYBERSPACE 
45 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_ 
viewer/NSTICstrategy_041511.pdf (listing the Fair Information Practice Prin-
ciples). 
 160. S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 316 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3438, 3746; see Meade Whitaker, Taxpayer Privacy vs. Freedom of Infor-
mation: Proposals To Amend Sec. 6103, 6 TAX ADVISER 198, 199 (1975) (refer-
ring to the IRS as a “gold mine” of information). 
 161. U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 1040—UNITED STATES INDI-
VIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs 
-pdf/f1040.pdf. 
 162. 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2012) (charitable contribution deduction); id. § 213 
(medical expense deduction); U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SCHEDULE A 
(FORM 1040)—ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-pdf/f1040sa.pdf (allowing deductions for medical and dental expenses 
and gifts to charity). 
 163. 26 U.S.C. § 7602. 
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rectness of the taxpayer’s return, as well as the authority to is-
sue an administrative summons requiring the taxpayer to pro-
duce those records.164 The IRS’s expansive authority to obtain 
taxpayer information also extends to facts and records held by 
third parties, including the taxpayer’s employer, bank, custom-
ers, and business associates.165  
Allowing qui tam action would pose a serious threat to the 
confidentiality of taxpayer information because a qui tam 
plaintiff would naturally request the production of relevant 
documents––in this case, tax returns and additional tax-related 
information—from the defendant, which, under normal circum-
stances, only the IRS has the authority to examine.166 In 
Lampert v. United States,167 the Ninth Circuit noted that “once 
[tax] return information is lawfully disclosed in a judicial fo-
rum, its subsequent disclosure by press release does not violate 
[§ 6103].”168 In reaching this conclusion, the court considered 
the taxpayer’s privacy interests in the return information: “We 
believe that Congress sought to prohibit only the disclosure of 
confidential tax return information. Once tax return infor-
mation is made a part of the public domain, the taxpayer may 
no longer claim a right of privacy in that information.”169 
Similar reasoning can be found in United States v. Pos-
ner.170 In Posner, the District Court refused the defendant’s re-
 
 164. Id. § 7602(a); see United States v. Norwest Corp., 116 F.3d 1227, 1231 
(8th Cir. 1997) (“Given the agency’s ‘broad mandate to investigate and audit 
persons who may be liable for taxes,’ courts should be wary of ‘restricting that 
authority so as to undermine the efficacy of the federal tax system.’” (quoting 
United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 145–46 (1975))). 
 165. 26 U.S.C. §§ 7602, 7609. 
 166. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (“A party may serve on any other party a re-
quest . . . to produce and permit the requesting party . . . to inspect, copy, test, 
or sample . . . any designated documents or electronically stored information—
including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, 
images, and other data or data compilations—stored in any medium . . . .”). 
 167. Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 
490 U.S. 1034 (1989). 
 168. Id. at 338. 
 169. Id.; see also Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) 
(stating that judicial proceedings are public records). The Ninth Circuit reiter-
ated its position that disclosure of return information already in the public 
domain does not violate § 6103 in Schrambling Accountancy Corp. v. United 
States, 937 F.2d 1485, 1488 (9th Cir. 1991). Contra Mallas v. United States, 
993 F.2d 1111, 1121–24 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that due to the absence of an 
explicit exception to § 6103 addressing the issue, information that has been 
made public nonetheless remains confidential in the hands of the IRS).  
 170. 594 F. Supp. 930 (S.D. Fla. 1984), aff’d, 764 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 
1985). 
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quest for a protective order that would have prevented a local 
newspaper from inspecting his tax returns that were admitted 
into evidence during the criminal trial of his codefendant.171 Re-
jecting the defendant’s argument, which was couched on 
§ 6103, the court ruled that even when the information is part 
of a federal tax return, once that information is in the public 
domain, entitlement to its privacy is lost.172 Thus, once a sus-
pected taxpayer’s information is revealed in a courtroom during 
qui tam litigation, there will be no going back no matter how 
unfounded the relator’s allegations turn out to be. A qui tam 
plaintiff would ultimately possess a dangerous weapon to pull 
all kinds of sensitive taxpayer information into the public do-
main regardless of the merit of its claims.  
b. Disrupting Taxpayer’s Voluntary Compliance 
Another important public policy argument that buttresses 
the protection of taxpayer information in favor of adopting qui 
tam action is the continuation of America’s “very successful 
voluntary assessment system.”173 Voluntary compliance is “the 
mainstay of the Federal tax system.”174 Breaching the confiden-
tiality of returns and return information can affect compliance 
in several ways. People may hesitate to file a tax return or hon-
estly report all income if the information may be used by some-
one besides the IRS in a way that may disadvantage them.175 
For instance, “the IRS determined that as a result of the insti-
tution of the refund offset program, some taxpayers changed 
their withholding (so that there would be no refund to offset) 
and a greater number of taxpayers stopped filing returns alto-
gether.”176  
 
 171. Id. at 931–32. 
 172. This line of decisions has its theoretical underpinning in the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, which noted that “[w]hat 
transpires in the court room is public property. . . . Those who see and hear 
what transpired can report it with impunity.” 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) (quot-
ing Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947)); see also Warner Commc’ns, 435 
U.S. at 609 (holding that the press has the right to publicize information in 
public court records, but not the right to obtain physical access to the infor-
mation). 
 173. S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 317 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3438, 3746 
 174. Id. 
 175. GAO, TAXPAYER PRIVACY, supra note 155, at 22.  
 176. 2000 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 140, at 33–34 (explaining that 
Congress recognized that taxpayers had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
which was an important component of voluntary compliance). 
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The taxpayer’s willingness to submit information truthful-
ly, without the threat of criminal investigation or summons, 
depends upon guarantees that the data collected by the IRS 
will be used for a proper purpose.177 Allowing qui tam action 
would thus seriously undermine taxpayers’ trust in the dis-
creetness and confidentiality of the tax collection process and 
expose them to fears of meritless accusations. If taxpayers 
knew that their tax returns and the related personal infor-
mation collected by the IRS may be used against them in a 
courtroom—especially by someone without expertise in tax law, 
or by someone who means to carry out a personal vendetta—
they would be less inclined to comply with the various report-
ing requirements.178  
C. THE IRS’S ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION MATTERS 
While noting the IRS’s exceptional span of prosecutorial 
discretion, Justice Stevens wrote in Allen v. Wright: “The Exec-
utive requires latitude to decide how best to enforce the law, 
and in general the Court may well be correct that the exercise 
of that discretion, especially in the tax context, is unchallenge-
able.”179 Qui tam would open the gate for private individuals to 
act like private IRS commissioners and bring claims against 
taxpayers.180 This Section analyzes various negative effects that 
 
 177. Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 1065, 1101 (2003) (analyzing the clash between the protection of tax-
payer privacy and a strategy to enhance tax compliance by publicizing high-
profile tax prosecution cases). 
 178. For a contrary opinion on the relationship between tax compliance 
and the protection of taxpayer confidentiality, see David E. Joyce, Note, Raid-
ing the Confessional—The Use of Income Tax Returns in Nontax Criminal In-
vestigations, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 1251, 1267, 1279 (1980) (noting that any 
correlation between voluntary compliance and confidentiality is merely specu-
lative). 
 179. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 792–93 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
In Allen v. Wright, the Court held that: (1) the parents did not have standing 
to prevent the government from violating the law in granting tax exemptions; 
(2) absent allegation of direct injury, standing could not be predicated on a 
claim of stigmatization caused by racial discrimination; and (3) a claim of inju-
ry to their children’s diminished ability to receive an education in a racially 
integrated school, although a judicially cognizable injury, failed because the 
alleged injury was not fairly traceable to the government’s conduct that was 
challenged as unlawful. See id. at 740, 754, 756–57, abrogated by Lexmark 
Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). 
 180. In fact, the IRS does not need to bring a lawsuit to collect tax due from 
taxpayers. Thus, in a theoretical sense, it is unclear what kind of “claim” or 
authority the tax qui tam relator would get from the IRS by being given a pri-
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the privatization of tax enforcement would bring to the overall 
tax enforcement system.  
1. Proliferation of Weak Claims 
First, the availability of qui tam suit would likely open a 
gate for excessive private enforcements.181 The so-called “privat-
ization” of tax enforcement would impact the quality of cases 
pursued, the number of cases pursued, and the strength of legal 
theories advanced when cases are pursued.182 Due to the poten-
tial of a windfall, some qui tam relators may start a lawsuit 
with poor factual support or flimsy legal theories that tend to 
“establish bad precedent and waste public resources.”183 Unlike 
the IRS, the qui tam relator does not have the ethical obligation 
to protect the interests of the public at large.184 Moreover, the 
private relator has no interest in considering the impact of friv-
olously imposing defense costs on target taxpayers.185 The IRS, 
on the other hand, may carefully weigh the costs and benefits of 
exercising its prosecutorial power, taking into account the 
whole picture of the taxpayer’s liability in light of its past re-
turns and other mitigating circumstances.186 Due to the vast 
amount of data that the IRS collects from a taxpayer, the agen-
cy would likely have a more balanced, vantage-point perspec-
tive on a defendant’s overall tax liability, compared to an overly 
zealous qui tam plaintiff who might have fallen upon a single 
piece of evidence of tax deficiency in a single fiscal year.187 
2. Interference with the Agency’s Enforcement Scheme 
A whistleblower’s qui tam action may disturb the IRS’s se-
cret investigation or long-term enforcement plans. First, pri-
vate relators’ suits may disrupt the cooperative relationship be-
tween the IRS and taxpayers that is essential for long-term 
 
vate right of action. The constitutional dimension of the assignability of the 
IRS’s prerogative is further explained in this Part.  
 181. Stephenson, supra note 84, at 114–17 . 
 182. Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem with Privatiza-
tion of Public Enforcement: The Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 281, 297 (2007) (summarizing the False Claims Act and critiqu-
ing how qui tam litigants have distorted prosecutorial decision making).  
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id.  
 186. See GAO, TAX WHISTLEBLOWERS, supra note 64, at 24–25. 
 187. See id. For examples of data that the IRS collects from a taxpayer, see 
supra Part II.B.2.a.  
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compliance with the Tax Code.188 Private enforcement actions 
may interfere with an agency’s ability “to negotiate with regu-
lated firms and other affected interests in order to establish a 
workable and consistent regulatory system.”189 Consequently, 
private enforcement suits may “engender an overemphasis on 
coercion and deterrence at the expense of negotiation and coop-
eration,” regardless of the wishes of the IRS on a particular 
matter.190  
Second, private enforcement actions can disrupt the IRS’s 
enforcement efforts by allowing qui tam relators, rather than 
IRS officials, to set the enforcement agenda.191 Under the FCA 
for instance, if a relator files a lawsuit, the government is often 
forced either to allow the suit to go forward, which may be un-
desirable from the government’s perspective, or to pursue its 
own preemptive enforcement action.192 Thus, private citizens 
would have the ability to skew the IRS enforcement priorities, 
perhaps even without intending to.193 Furthermore, judicial de-
cisions rendered in qui tam suits, brought piecemeal before po-
tentially non-expert courts194 by plaintiffs with their own pri-
vate interests, may establish “inconsistent precedents that 
complicate or disrupt government enforcement efforts.”195 
3. Lack of Accountability 
Another downside of allowing qui tam actions in the feder-
al tax context is private plaintiffs’ lack of accountability for the 
 
 188. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Rethinking Environmental Citizen Suits, 8 
TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 55, 67 (1989). 
 189. Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private 
Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1292–93 (1982); see also Jeannette L. Austin, 
The Rise of Citizen-Suit Enforcement in Environmental Law: Reconciling Pri-
vate and Public Attorneys General, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 220, 223 (1987) (“[Citi-
zen] suits may impair the EPA’s ability to develop longstanding, cooperative 
relationships with regulated firms. These relationships, when used in conjunc-
tion with aggressive enforcement, are vital to attaining environmental en-
forcement objectives.”); Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory 
Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 
81, 84 (2002) (stating that “[o]fficious citizen enforcers” might undermine co-
operative enforcement efforts because “the informal bargains struck by regula-
tors and regulatees cannot protect the latter from citizen litigation”). 
 190. See Stephenson, supra note 84, at 118. 
 191. See id. 
 192. See id. 
 193. See Austin, supra note 189, at 236; Cross, supra note 188, at 68. 
 194. See infra Part II.D for the discussion of jurisdictional issues when it 
comes to a tax qui tam suit.  
 195. See Stephenson, supra note 84, at 119. 
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social impact of their enforcement decisions.196 As Professor 
Matthew Stephenson has aptly pointed out in his discussion of 
the effective use of the private enforcement mechanism, “Prose-
cutorial discretion is an integral part of the American system of 
government, and executive agencies are accountable to the 
electorate for their exercise of this discretion through the Pres-
ident and, more indirectly, through congressional oversight.”197 
Thus, when the IRS considers whether to increase or decrease 
the level of enforcement of particular Tax Code provisions, it 
will most likely become sensitive to the political repercussions 
that may follow such enforcement decisions.198 As neither the 
citizens bringing tax qui tam suits nor the judges who decide 
them are subject to electoral reckoning, allowing this additional 
private enforcement scheme in the federal system may under-
mine the important democratic self-check function of American 
governance.199 
The problem of allowing too much private enforcement in 
too many areas of the federal administrative law is sometimes 
thought to have a quasi-constitutional dimension, inasmuch 
as congressionally authorized citizen suits can interfere with 
the executive branch’s efforts to “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.”200 Though private enforcement suits have 
been upheld as constitutional as long as the private plaintiffs 
satisfy the standing requirements of Article III,201 many com-
mentators perceive a constitutional problem with allowing qui 
 
 196. See id. 
 197. Id. (citing Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits 
and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1793, 1801–04 (1993); Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 
1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 91–99 (1985)). 
 198. See Krent & Shenkman, supra note 197, at 1803–04. 
 199. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 189, at 1292 (noting that private 
rights of action can “undermin[e] the advantages of political accountability, 
specialization, and centralization that administrative regulation was designed 
to provide”); see also Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing As an Essential 
Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 896 (1983) 
(arguing that, when judges insist on a level of enforcement that the political 
process would not demand of the executive, the judges are likely to be enforc-
ing, perhaps unintentionally, the political prejudices of the elite class from 
which they come). 
 200. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see supra Part II.A. 
 201. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 
765, 777–78 (2000) (holding that the FCA’s grant of qui tam standing to pri-
vate individuals does not violate Article III’s standing requirement, relying on 
the history of qui tam litigation which goes back to the thirteenth century and 
the assignment of claim doctrine). 
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tam relators to determine the stringency with which the law 
will be enforced.202 This problem is particularly acute “when the 
private citizen’s injury, even if sufficient to satisfy Article III, 
does not seem to be the kind of personal injury for which the 
law usually provides compensation.”203  
D. PROBLEM OF JURISDICTION—TAX COURT OR DISTRICT 
COURT?  
In addition to the often-predicted problems of breach of 
confidentiality, frivolous claims, and interference with the 
IRS’s enforcement activities, a set of very practical problems 
remains against the adoption of the qui tam action. For in-
stance, which court would have jurisdiction over a qui tam case 
involving a whistleblower plaintiff and a taxpayer defendant? 
Should the U.S. Tax Court have jurisdiction or should a federal 
district court have such jurisdiction? Should a tax relator be 
entitled to the forum of his choice between the two?  
There is an important distinction between the two poten-
tial federal forums. If the Tax Court were to have jurisdiction 
over a qui tam case, the taxpayer defendant would be deprived 
of the presence of a jury during the trial because “[t]here is no 
right to trial by jury in the Tax Court.”204 Normally, the fact 
that there is no jury trial available in Tax Court is neither a vi-
olation of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution205 nor a 
violation of the Seventh Amendment.206 However, these hold-
 
 202. See, e.g., Krent & Shenkman, supra note 197, at 1794–95 (arguing 
forcefully that Article III precludes general citizen suits, but conceding that 
Congress may allow suits by individuals who are “injured distinctively” by 
failure to enforce the law); cf. Cross, supra note 188, at 72 (discussing envi-
ronmental citizen suits). 
 203. Stephenson, supra note 84, at 120. In the tax context, it is unclear 
whether the IRS has suffered an “injury” in a legal sense that might be “as-
signed” to a third party private plaintiff. Vt. Agency, 529 U.S. at 773. 
 204. Fed. Tax Coordinator Second Series (RIA) ¶ U-2005 (July 3, 2013). 
Nor can a case be removed from the Tax Court to a district court merely in or-
der to have a jury trial. Id.  
 205. Euzent v. Comm’r, No. 77-2023, 1978 WL 4593, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 11, 
1978) (refuting the plaintiffs’ assertion that § 7422 violates the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment by ruling that due process only requires the 
taxpayer be afforded a hearing at some stage before the tax is irrevocably 
fixed). 
 206. Beard v. Comm’r, No. 98-1823, 1999 WL 455324, at *1 (6th Cir. June 
23, 1999) (“The Seventh Amendment protects the right to a jury trial as it ex-
isted in suits at common law. No right of action at common law existed against 
a sovereign. Thus, a right to jury trial in an action against the United States 
exists only as provided by statute and no statute provides for a jury trial in the 
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ings are based upon the fact that the government was being 
sued by a taxpayer who disputed the IRS’s collection decision.207 
Here, a private qui tam plaintiff would be suing a private tax-
payer. If the tax relator’s claim involves a criminal violation of 
the Tax Code, the Sixth Amendment would require that the ac-
cused “enjoy the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury.”208  
Even if the case involves a simple tax underpayment, how-
ever, the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution would 
likely require a trial by jury.209 The Seventh Amendment pro-
vides: “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved . . . .”210 According to Justice Scalia, the author of the 
majority opinion in Vermont Agency,211 qui tam action is deeply 
embedded in the common law tradition.212 He traces the tradi-
tion of qui tam actions back to the 13th century when private 
individuals “began bringing actions in the royal courts on both 
their own and the Crown’s behalf.”213 His logic seems to indicate 
that a qui tam action may fall within the ambit of the Seventh 
Amendment guarantee of civil jury trial because of its root in 
the common law.214 Thus, if a tax qui tam action ends up being 
litigated in the Tax Court, the defendant taxpayer would likely 
challenge the constitutionality of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction 
because of the deprivation of a jury trial.  
On the other hand, if a U.S. district court were to adjudi-
cate a qui tam claim against a taxpayer, both parties of the 
lawsuit would lose the benefit of the expertise that the Tax 
Court possesses. Trying a case before a judge with no federal 
tax expertise may turn out to be a risky venture for the target-
ed taxpayer who would be trying to defend its position in front 
of a jury. Seventy years ago, in Dobson v. Commissioner, the 
 
Tax Court.” (citations omitted)); Gillis v. I.R.S., 578 F. Supp. 69, 69 (D.N.H. 
1983) (holding that since there is no common law right of action against the 
sovereign, the Seventh Amendment does not apply to suits against the United 
States and thus the United States was not required to furnish a taxpayer with 
a jury trial before seeking to assess a tax deficiency).  
 207. Beard, 1999 WL 455324, at *1; Gillis, 578 F. Supp. at 70; Euzent, 1978 
WL 4593, at *1. 
 208. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 209. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 210. Id. (emphasis added). 
 211. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 
765, 774–75 (2000). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 774. 
 214. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
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Supreme Court characterized federal tax law as a body of law 
“so complex as to be the despair of judges.”215 The Court stated 
that “[i]t can never be made simple” because it “touches human 
activities at so many points.”216 Since this unavoidable complex-
ity in the tax laws—“complexity which is built into the statutes 
and regulations, and which the courts are powerless to 
change”217—has increased even more since the time of Dobson, 
adjudicating tax qui tam cases in a non-expert court may prove 
to be an unwise policy as well. As the difficulties of adopting 
qui tam provisions to the Tax Code have been explored in 
depth, Part III of this Note will proceed to offer two alternative 
solutions to the problem.  
III.  REMODELING TAX COURT APPEAL RIGHT & 
PROHIBITING SUBMISSION OF PRIVILEGED 
INFORMATION   
In early 2013, the Treasury Department proposed a set of 
new regulations pertaining to the administration of the IRS 
whistleblower program.218 Some of these new regulations were 
designed to correct the lack of transparency that critics have 
often complained about. For instance, the Proposed Treasury 
Regulation § 301.7623–3 permits claimants “to participate in 
the whistleblower administrative proceeding through a struc-
tured process involving correspondence and other communica-
tions with the Whistleblower Office.”219 According to the regula-
tions, informants will be “afforded opportunities to review the 
Whistleblower Office’s preliminary award recommendation, to 
provide additional information regarding their claims that is 
relevant to an award determination, and to submit comments 
challenging all aspects of the preliminary findings at the ad-
ministrative level.”220  
These new regulations exemplify the IRS’s recent efforts to 
improve the efficiency and transparency of the current whistle-
blower program. Nevertheless, this Part proposes two addition-
 
 215. Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489, 498 (1943). 
 216. Id. at 494–95. 
 217. David F. Shores, Deferential Review of Tax Court Decisions: Dobson 
Revisited, 49 TAX LAW. 629, 629 (1996). 
 218. IRS Issues Comprehensive Proposed Regs on Whistleblower Program, 
58 Fed. Taxes Weekly Alert (RIA) No. 51 Article 6 (Dec. 20, 2012). 
 219. Awards for Information Relating To Detecting Underpayments of Tax 
or Violations of the Internal Revenue Laws, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,798, 74,802 (pro-
posed Dec. 18, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 301.7623–1(b)(2)(iii)). 
 220. Id.  
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al changes to the program that would help increase the IRS’s 
accountability towards informants and reduce the IRS’s claim 
processing time. Part III.A proposes a statutory amendment of 
the existing tax court appeal right and Part III.B proposes 
granting a limited immunity to whistleblowers for providing 
their clients’ confidential information to the IRS.  
A. CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND § 7623(B)(4) TO BREATHE LIFE 
BACK INTO THE TAX COURT APPEAL RIGHT. 
One way to reinvigorate the IRS whistleblower program is 
to reinforce the tax court appeal right under § 7623(b)(4) by 
modifying its statutory language. As further explained in Part 
I.C.2, the Tax Court appeal right under § 7623(b)(4) lost its 
sting under a series of recent Tax Court decisions holding that 
the IRS’s denial of award cannot be judicially revisited as long 
as the IRS did not take any action based on the informant’s 
tips.221 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court effec-
tively affirmed this reasoning on October 15, 2013, when it is-
sued an order denying certiorari of O’Donnell v. Commissioner, 
a case where the Tax Court granted summary judgment in fa-
vor of the IRS because the information provided did not cause 
the IRS to initiate any action.222  
A simple amendment to the language of § 7623(b)(4) will be 
sufficient to fix this problem.223 Section 7623(b)(4) states that 
“[a]ny determination regarding an award under paragraph (1), 
(2), or (3) may . . . be appealed to the Tax Court . . . .”224 Para-
graph (1) of the same Section provides: “If the Secretary pro-
ceeds with any administrative or judicial action . . . based on 
 
 221. See supra Part I.C.2 and the related tax court decisions. 
 222. O’Donnell v. Comm’r, 489 F. App’x 469, 469 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 446 (2013). The Treasury Department’s pro-
posed regulations promulgated in early 2013 also clarify that the IRS cannot 
pay an award under § 7623 without taking some action beyond simply analyz-
ing or investigating information submitted to it. The IRS would have to initi-
ate a new action that it wouldn’t have initiated, expand the scope of an ongo-
ing action that it wouldn’t have expanded, or continue to pursue an ongoing 
action that it wouldn’t have continued but for the information provided. 
Awards for Information Relating to Detecting Underpayments of Tax or Viola-
tions of the Internal Revenue Laws, 77 Fed. Reg. at 74,806. 
 223. See Kneave Riggall, Should Tax Informants Be Paid? The Law and 
Economics of a Government Monopsony, 28 VA. TAX. REV. 237, 267–68 (2008) 
(“[A]n informant’s right to an independent judicial review of the Service’s re-
fusal to pay a reward would do more to increase the informant’s expected val-
ue of that reward than would an unreviewable Service ‘guarantee.’”). 
 224. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(4) (2012). 
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information brought . . . by an individual, such individual 
shall . . . receive as an award at least 15 percent . . . of the col-
lected proceeds . . . .”225 Read in conjunction, the Tax Court in-
terprets these two provisions to mean “whistleblower awards 
are preconditioned on the Secretary’s proceeding with an ad-
ministrative or judicial action.”226 According to the court, “[i]f 
the Secretary does not proceed, there can be no whistleblower 
award.”227  
The Tax Court’s holding would likely change if the lan-
guage of § 7623(b)(4) were modified to include the IRS’s denial 
to take any action. For example, “[a]ny determination regard-
ing an award under paragraph (1), (2), or (3)”228 could be 
changed into: “Any determination regarding the amount of an 
award under paragraph (1), (2), or (3), or failure to pursue an 
administrative or judicial action described in subsection (a).” 
This change clarifies that the IRS’s denial to take any action 
may be judicially reviewed. Another way to improve the statu-
tory language is to insert “with or without regard to the exist-
ence of any administrative or judicial action described in sub-
section (a)” within paragraph (4), so that the paragraph would 
read: “Any determination regarding an award under paragraph 
(1), (2), or (3), with or without regard to the existence of any 
administrative or judicial action described in subsection (a), 
may, within 30 days of such determination, be appealed to the 
Tax Court.”229  
Modifications of this sort will allow Congress to eliminate 
the current ambiguity in § 7623(b), which has been a fertile 
ground for lawsuits since the 2006 amendment.230 Although 
skeptics might still argue that the reinforced appeal right may 
equally disturb the IRS’s enforcement agenda by increased tax 
court intervention, at least the problems of constitutional 
standing, taxpayer privacy leak, and the forum selection para-
dox that are inherent under a qui tam regime will be eliminat-
ed. In addition, the lamented absence of any appeal right for in-
formants whose information has been completely ignored by 
the IRS may thus be rectified.  
 
 225. Id. § 7623(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 226. Cooper v. Comm’r (Cooper II), 136 T.C. 597, 601 (2011) (emphasis 
added).  
 227. Id. 
 228. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(4). 
 229. See id. 
 230. See Coder, supra note 17, at 1168–69. 
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B. CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND § 7623 IN ORDER TO CLARIFY 
THE PERMITTED USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION  
In order to reduce the whistleblower claim processing time 
and eliminate uncertainty, Congress should add a subsection 
under § 7623(b) to clarify the rules regarding the use of confi-
dential information provided by a tax whistleblower. More spe-
cifically, the law should allow tax professionals to report their 
clients’ tax code violation to the IRS even if it means that the 
clients’ confidential information may be revealed in the process. 
On the other hand, matters that are protected by the attorney-
client privilege should always be kept sacred.231  
Navigating through the multi-layered structure of state 
laws concerning a tax professional’s duty of confidentiality,232 
federal statutory exemptions to the duty of confidentiality that 
preempt the state laws,233 and federal common law rules con-
cerning the evidentiary use of privileged materials234 is like ex-
ploring a labyrinth. It is no wonder the IRS claims its legal risk 
analysis team needs so much time to filter out privileged mate-
rials from the bulk of information provided by a whistleblow-
er.235  
 
 231. Although sometimes used interchangeably, “confidential” information 
and “privileged” communication are not synonymous. SUE MICHMERHUIZEN, 
ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CONFIDENTIALITY, PRIVI-
LEGE: A BASIC VALUE IN TWO DIFFERENT APPLICATIONS 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_ re-
sponsibility/confidentiality_or_attorney.authcheckdam.pdf (“The attorney-
client privilege only protects the essence of the communications actually had 
by the client and lawyer and only extends to information given for the purpose 
of obtaining legal representation. The underlying information is not protected 
if it is available from another source. . . . By contrast, the ethical duty of client-
lawyer confidentiality is quite extensive in terms of what information is pro-
tected. It applies not only to matters communicated in confidence by the client 
but also to all information relating to the representation regardless of whether 
it came from the client herself, or from another source.”). 
 232. Different categories of tax professionals are governed by different pro-
fessional rules and state statutes. See generally Riggall, supra note 223, at 
257–65 (analyzing the different rules applying to tax return preparers, IRS 
enrolled agents, CPAs, and attorneys). 
 233. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2012). 
 234. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (“The common law—as interpreted by United 
States courts in the light of reason and experience—governs a claim of privi-
lege unless any of the following provides otherwise: the United States Consti-
tution; a federal statute; or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. But in a 
civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which 
state law supplies the rule of decision.”). 
 235. See supra Part I.C.1. 
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Perhaps due to this daunting complexity or the fear of 
disincentivizing the informants, the current Tax Code and 
treasury regulations are silent as to the use of confidential in-
formation provided by whistleblowers.236 However, the IRS has 
set up an internal policy to filter out privileged information 
that may be of limited use in a courtroom in case the audited 
taxpayer challenges the validity of the information on eviden-
tiary grounds.237 This filtering process conducted by the agen-
cy’s legal specialists consumes a tremendous amount of time, 
preventing the IRS from quickly moving on with the inform-
ant’s claims.238 Although the IRS boasts that such practice pre-
serves the “integrity” of its audit procedure,239 tax professionals 
who blew the whistle using their clients’ confidential infor-
mation suffer from delay in processing time and uncertainty in 
the ultimate outcome.  
Presumably cognizant of the problem, the IRS proposed a 
new set of regulations on December 18, 2012, which expressly 
rejects any claim for an award filed by “an individual who is or 
was required by Federal law or regulation to disclose the in-
formation or who is or was precluded by Federal law or regula-
tion from disclosing the information.”240 However, the proposed 
regulations have not yet been codified.241  
Lamenting the absence of a provision in the Tax Code re-
garding the IRS’s use of privileged information, a member of 
the Young Tax Lawyers Committee of the State Bar of Califor-
nia suggested that the IRS revise its proposed regulations to 
completely ban the holders of privileged information from be-
coming informants.242 The Committee member views the pro-
posed regulations’ language as too weak and ambiguous to 
completely exclude an individual who holds privileged infor-
mation from being “eligible” for awards.243  
 
 236. See McLaughlin, supra note 81, at 4 n.17.  
 237. See Whitlock Interview, supra note 68, at 86.  
 238. See id. at 87–88. 
 239. Id. at 86. 
 240. Awards for Information Relating To Detecting Underpayments of Tax 
or Violations of the Internal Revenue Laws, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,798, 74,805 (pro-
posed Dec. 18, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 301.7623–1(b)(2)(iii)) (em-
phasis added). 
 241. Although public comments were due February 19, 2013, no further 
developments have occurred as of the publishing of this note. 
 242. McLaughlin, supra note 81, at 6. 
 243. Id. at 4–5. 
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At the opposite side of the spectrum is Professor Ventry, 
who opined that Congress should amend the Tax Code, follow-
ing the example of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, by explicitly per-
mitting attorney-informants to disclose confidential infor-
mation when the taxpayer client is involved in a material 
violation of law.244 A “material violation of law” under Sar-
banes-Oxley does not have to rise to the level of a “crime or 
fraud,” which would constitute a separate exception of its own 
to the confidentiality and attorney-client privilege rule.245 Ac-
cording to Professor Ventry, the public benefits generated by 
aggressive tax enforcement outweigh this sacrifice of the pro-
fessional duty of confidentiality.246 
Neither Professor Ventry’s nor the Committee’ member’s 
approach is sufficient to solve the problem. The Committee’s 
position is too extreme, most likely to have a chilling effect on 
the potential whistleblowers that often hold the most accurate 
and direct information on tax cheats. Professor Ventry’s idea, 
on the other hand, runs the risk of being misinterpreted by the 
public, who may lack the knowledge to distinguish between 
privileged communications and confidential information. Po-
tential whistleblowers may thus bring in more and more unus-
able privileged information to the IRS, further clogging the op-
eration of the Whistleblower Office.247  
This Note proposes a combination of the two ideas with a 
slight adjustment: Congress should amend § 7623 by expressly 
 
 244. See Ventry, supra note 12, at 390, 401.  
 245. ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(3) patently permits a 
lawyer to become a federal tax informant if she discovers that a client has 
used her services to intentionally violate a federal tax law. The rule states:  
A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a 
client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: . . . to 
prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interest 
or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has re-
sulted from the client’s commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance 
of which the client has used the lawyer’s services.  
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(3) (1983). 
 246. See Ventry, supra note 12, at 404–06. 
 247. According to § 7525 of the Tax Code, the common law protection of 
privileged information between a tax attorney and her client is equally appli-
cable to other types of “federally authorized tax practitioner[s]” with respect to 
“tax advice.” 26 U.S.C. § 7525(a) (2012) (“With respect to tax advice, the same 
common law protections of confidentiality which apply to a communication be-
tween a taxpayer and an attorney shall also apply to a communication be-
tween a taxpayer and any federally authorized tax practitioner to the extent 
the communication would be considered a privileged communication if it were 
between a taxpayer and an attorney.”). 
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permitting tax professionals to blow the whistle based on their 
clients’ confidential information when the tax professional is 
reasonably certain of a material Tax Code violation. However, 
the Code or the treasury regulations thereunder should be 
modified to make sure that any testimonial evidence protected 
by the privileges recognized under federal common law must be 
filtered out by the whistleblower before making a report to the 
IRS. This way, the holders of privileged information will not be 
barred completely from becoming whistleblowers and will be 
able to provide their taxpayer client’s confidential information 
without fear of exposing themselves to malpractice lawsuits or 
disciplinary sanctions from their professional associations.248 
Additionally, the IRS would likely hasten its claim review pro-
cess because it will be relieved of its burden to sort through the 
privileged information that may be disallowed in a federal 
courtroom.  
  CONCLUSION   
The IRS’s tax whistleblower program provides handsome 
rewards for those who report incidents of Tax Code violations, 
reaching up to thirty percent of the total amount of collected 
proceeds. However, the program is also notorious for its exces-
sively slow processing time which usually consumes several 
years and the IRS’s nonappealable enforcement discretion in 
administering it. Although some commentators propose import-
ing qui tam action to the Tax Code to remedy these problems, 
that approach would invoke challenges on constitutional 
grounds and give birth to dangerous consequences that would 
offset the purported benefits of increased private enforcement.  
Instead of arguing for a drastic change in the tax enforce-
ment scheme, this Note proposes amending the language under 
§ 7623(b)(4) to correct the effects of the recent decisions that 
took the sting out of the Tax Court appeal right. In addition, 
this Note suggests adding a clause under § 7623 allowing for 
the use of confidential information provided by the tax profes-
sional-whistleblowers, but disallowing submission of materials 
protected by the privileges recognized under the federal com-
 
 248. Most state laws on professional duty of confidentiality contain excep-
tions that allow disclosure that is authorized by law. See MICHMERHUIZEN, su-
pra note 231, at 2. However, the tax professional informants may still be sub-
ject to civil liability based on a breach of contract theory, in case they signed a 
nondisclosure agreement with the taxpayer. See Riggall, supra note 223, at 
256–57.  
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mon law. The latter solution will help alleviate the IRS’s bur-
den of filtering out illegitimate, unusable evidence as well as 
protect tax professional-whistleblowers from tort claims or pro-
fessional sanctions.  
